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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PRUDENTIAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
JAMSHID MARDANLOU, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
No. 16126 
This is an action brought by Prudential Property & 
Casualty Insurance Company for declaratory relief pursuant 
to §78-33-1 et seq., Utah Code Annotated (1953) seeking to 
rescind a renter's (homeowner's) policy because of material 
misrepresentations made by the defendant when applying for 
said insurance. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After a non-jury trial, the District Court of Salt Lake 
County, James s. Sawaya, Judge, determined that the policy 
of insurance was void, rescinded the policy, and entered a 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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judgment providing that plaintiff was relieved from any 
further obligation to defendant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks affirmance of the trial court's 
decision. 
FACTS 
Respondent disagrees with appellant's statement of the 
facts. Appellant states the facts in a light favorable to 
appellant and contrary to the findings of the trial court; 
appellant's recitation of the facts is argumentative. Ac-
cordingly, respondent will set forth a detailed chronological 
statement of the facts. References are to Exhibit Numbers, 
pages of depositions or statements, to the record, and in 
referring to the trial transcript, the transcript page 
designated "T". 
The argumentative nature of appellant's statement of 
facts is well illustrated on page 4 of Appellant's Brief 
wherein it is stated that "the appellant is an Iranian 
citizen who has English language difficulties". Reference 
is made to three pages of the Transcript wherein the appel-
lant made self-serving statements to the effect that he did 
not understand the questions being asked of him. The clear 
weight of the evidence, however, was to the contrary. The 
Aetna adjuster (Mr. Oslowski) who negotiated the first 
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burglary loss testified (T-145) that he had several face-to-
face meetings with the defendant and that while there were 
some language difficulties "he spoke relatively good English. 
I think we were basically able to communicate". Prudential's 
agent (Mr. Ferguson) testified that he had no difficulty 
communicating with the defendant (T-66). A year before, 
when defendant applied for the Aetna policy he discussed the 
matter over the telephone with Linda Messerly, an employee 
of Ed D. Smith & Sons which was the local agent for Aetna. 
She had no problem in communicating with him (T-37). It 
should be observed that the defendant had been in the 
United States for six years (at the time of the trial) had 
a Ph.D. in physicial education from the University of Utah, 
and had taught classes at the University (T-3-4). Defendant 
admitted that when he was discussing the insurance with 
Prudential's agent that there was no confusion (T-171) and 
that he recalls no language difficulties nor the need for an 
interpreter (although one was available) at the time his 
statement was taken in April, 1977 (T-191). Further, the 
trial court made a specific finding that the defendant was 
conversant in the English language and could speak, write 
and understand same (R-84). 
The crucial facts of this case may be summarized as 
follows: 
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(1) In October, 1975 the defendant applied for and 
received a binder of homeowner's insurance from Aetna 
Insurance Company. 
(2) A few days later he reported a suspicious burglary 
and the loss of $8,600.00 of personal property. 
(3) That he made claim against Aetna Insurance Company, 
which was disputed; defendant complained at one time to the 
State Insurance Commissioner regarding Aetna's handling of 
the claim. 
(4) Aetna cancelled his insurance policy and later 
compromised his claim for approximately $5,000.00 
(5) That defendant knew he had been cancelled by 
Aetna. 
(6) Less than one year later, on October 6, 1976, 
defendant applied for a similar policy of insurance with the 
appellant. Appellant's agent, Lloyd D. Ferguson, asked him 
certain questions and based upon defendant's responses 
completed an application which the defendant signed. 
(7) That appellant's agent asked him about prior 
losses, prior insurance, and whether he had ever been 
cancelled. 
(8) That defendant did not disclose to the agent that 
he had been insured by and/or cancelled by Aetna, nor did he 
disclose another prior loss. 
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(9) That defendant had ample opportunity to review the 
application and in fact later pointed out to the agent an 
error in the inception date of the policy, however, defendant 
did not advise the agent of the inaccuracy of the statements 
regarding prior insurance or prior losses. 
(10) That in reliance upon the information furnished 
by defendant the agent bound coverage and subsequently a 
policy was issued by the Prudential Insurance Company. 
(11) Approximately ten days later defendant sustained a 
loss on account of a mysterious fire and made claim against 
the respondent. 
(12) That respondent's general underwriting policies 
and guidelines, and particularly those written instructions 
given to agents, prohibit an agent from binding coverage 
when the applicant had been cancelled within the last year. 
That if the true facts had been known to respondent, it 
would not have insured the defendant. 
THE AETNA CLAIM 
On October 2, 1975, the defendant called the Ed D. Smith 
Insurance Agency and talked with Linda Messerly (T-7,24-26). 
He requested coverage on certain unscheduled personal prop-
erty and she prepared a binder. The binder was sent to the 
defendant at the address he gave her on October 2, 1975 (T-32). 
On October 7, 1975, the defendant called Ed D. Smith Agency 
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a second time and asked if two Persian rugs would also be 
covered under the policy and when informed that they would 
not in absence of a separate binder, he ordered the addi-
tional coverage (T-7-8). Both binders were mailed to him on 
October 2 and October 7, 1975, respectively, and he received 
both binders in the mail (T-7, 8, 32). 
On the evening of October 8, the defendant allegedly 
sustained a burglary loss and reported that loss to the 
agency the next day, October 9 (T-8,9). Thereafter, the 
defendant dealt with a Mr. Oslowski, a claims adjuster for 
Aetna, and met with him on several occasions attempting to 
negotiate the claim (T-9, 11; Deposition of Mr. Oslowski, 
page 8-10). 
Exhibit P-5 consists of a folder containing miscellane-
ous documents prepared by the Ed D. Smith Agency. Copies of 
the binders were mailed in the ordinary course of business 
and so far as the Agency's records show, were received by 
the defendant. The defendant did not pay the agreed premium 
and Ed D. Smith sent out nine separate billings (before 
writing off the account), all of which were apparently re-
ceived with one exception (the billing of October 9, 1975), 
which may have been returned because the complete address 
was not visible through the window in the envelope. 
On October 17, 1975, Linda Messerly sent a letter to 
Mr. Mardanlou advising him that the insurance policy had 
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been cancelled by Aetna for underwriting reasons. Miss 
Messerly had been instructed to cancel the policy by Aetna. 
At that time, the defendant was not overdue in payment of 
the premium (T-34-36). 
Appellant contends that the cancellation letter was 
mailed to the wrong address and denies receiving it. The 
cancellation letter, however, was sent to 422 South 1200 
East, Apartment No. 19, which was the address that he 
first gave to Miss Messerly over the telephone. Appellant 
claimed at the trial that he was living at Apartment No. 9. 
However, he admits that he received both the original 
homeowner's policy binder and also the "valuable items 
policy" binder (T-7, 8) both of which show his address as 
Apartment 19. The nine billings were all mailed to Apart-
ment 19 and, as above indicated, only one was ever returned 
by the post office. Significantly, the cancellation letter 
was never returned (T-33). 
The defendant's negotiations with Oslowski regarding 
the first burglary went on for several months. In fact, 
defendant complained to the insurance commissioner regarding 
Aetna's handling of his claim (T-12-13). Defendant executed 
a proof of loss on November 18, 1975 (Exhibit P-2) making 
claim for $8,604.00. On January 29, 1976, defendant exe-
cuted two releases (Exhibit P-3) and received two checks 
totaling $5,485.00 (Exhibit P-4). 
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Defendant admits that the Aetna claims adjuster, Mr. 
Oslowski, told him sometime between mid-October and the end 
of January that he was cancelled (T-13, 14, 167, 189, 190). 
Defendant also submitted an affidavit in connection with the 
instant lawsuit wherein he stated that he heard a "oral 
rumor" that part of the policy had been cancelled (R-68). 
Homeowner's policies are written normally for a minimum 
of three months and most commonly for a period of one year 
(Deposition of Mr. Oslowski, pages 13-14). Defendant ad-
mitted that when he applied for the Aetna policy he intended 
to be insured for one year (T-15). However, the proof of 
loss which he admittedly signed (P-2) and the checks which 
he admitted he cashed (P-4) reflected on their face 
that both the homeowner's policy and the endorsement 
expired prior to the end of October, 1975. 
While Mr. Oslowski did not know the exact reason why 
the Aetna underwriting office instructed the agent to can-
cel the policies, there would usually be only two reasons 
therefor. First, nonpayment of premium, or secondly, 
the suspicious nature of the loss and general underwriting 
considerations (Deposition of Mr. Oslowski, pages 29-30). 
As indicated, however, Linda Messerly testified that defen-
dant was not overdue in payment of premiums as of October 
17, the date of the cancellation letter (T-36). 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
THE APPLICATION WITH PRUDENTIAL 
Lloyd Ferguson was the insurance salesman for Pruden-
tial. On October 6, 1976, he met the defendant at the 
physical education department at the University of Utah 
(T-5, 49). The defendant was first interested in obtaining 
automobile insurance but when Mr. Ferguson learned that the 
defendant had not had any automobile insurance for the last 
30 days, he told him that Prudential would not consider 
issuing him a policy. Thereafter, they discussed home-
owner' s or renter's insurance. The defendant was interested 
in such insurance because he had some valuable Persian rugs, 
and wanted them insured for a total of $15,000.00 (T-5S). 
Mr. Ferguson then started completing the "application for 
homeowner's policy" (Exhibit P-1). The application requires 
information regarding past addresses, marital status, 
employer, etc. The significant items for the purposes of 
this litigation are as set forth in paragraphs SA and SB, 
which make inquiry regarding prior homeowner's insurance 
history and prior losses. Mr. Ferguson specifically asked 
the defendant whether any insurance company had cancelled, 
refused to renew or declined acceptance during the last 
three years; the defendant answered "no" to each question 
(T-55). When Mr. Ferguson asked him about prior losses, the 
defendant first stated no, and then admitted that he had a 
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loss at his prior address a year before but that he had lost 
only some "minor items" such as gloves, goggles and ski 
poles. At no time did the defendant give any indication of 
the magnitude of the prior loss nor did he ever give any 
indication that he had had a policy of insurance with Aetna 
(T-56, 61-62, 81). 
The defendant identified Exhibit P-1 and acknowledged 
that he had signed it up at the University (T-4-5). He was 
furnished a copy of the application which he took home with 
him. A few days later, while reading over the application, 
he noticed that Mr. Ferguson had inadvertently written 
in 12-01-76 as the inception date of the policy, when the 
inception date should have been 10-06-76 (T-15, 159, 178). 
He called Mr. Ferguson and told him about the error and told 
him to change it otherwise he was going to cancel the policy 
(T-178). At no time, however, did defendant ever advise Mr. 
Ferguson or any other agent of Prudential that in fact he 
had been previously insured with Aetna and that he had been 
cancelled (T-61, 178). 
Defendant admitted to the burglary loss in October, 
1975, and that admission is reflected in paragraph BB of the 
application. However, as above indicated, the defendant did 
not disclose the magnitude of that loss. It further appears 
that defendant failed to advise the agent of yet another 
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loss which occurred in California some time within the prior 
three years (T-18, 157). 
Thereafter, Mr. Ferguson corrected the application form 
and delivered a corrected copy to Mr. Mardanlou and then 
submitted the application to Prudential for the issuance 
of a policy (T-61, 66). Shortly thereafter the defendant's 
apartment was badly damaged by a fire of mysterious origin 
on October 19, 1976, and he made claim against Prudential 
(T-19-20). 
MATERIALITY OF THE MISREPRESENTATION 
Prudential's agent, Lloyd Ferguson, was delegated a 
certain amount of "binding authority", which meant that 
under some circumstances he could bind coverage without 
approval from the regional office of Prudential (which in 
this case was in Phoenix, Arizona) (T-46). However, there 
were several restrictions upon his binding authority and he 
was not authorized to bind coverage if the applicant had 
been declined, refused renewal or cancelled within 12 months 
by any other company or if there had been more than two 
losses during the last three years (T-47, 48, 62-64). 
Mr. Ferguson identified and explained the contents of 
an 11-page folder referred to in the industry as an "HR-10", 
"selection of homeowner's risks", which was admitted as 
plaintiff's Exhibits P-6. That document was in effect in 
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October of 1976 and governed the agent's binding authority. 
It specifically provides that "coverage may ~ be bound 
when one of the following conditions exist". The document 
then lists seven restrictions including value and amount of 
insurance, the nature of the structure, the location of the 
structure, the nature of the ownership or occupancy, the 
amount of scheduled personal property and whether outboard 
motors and boats are involved. Specifically, under subsec-
tion E entitled "insurance history", it is provided that 
coverage may not be bound when "there have been more than 
two losses of any kind within the last 36 months . • " and 
"during the last 12 months an insurance company has de-
clined, cancelled or refused to renew similar insurance for 
underwriting reasons " .. Exhibit P-6 further provides 
that a certain amount of flexibility is permitted, even if 
an applicant had been cancelled within the last 12 months; 
it is provided, however, that such an applicant may not be 
bound but that the agent may send an inquiry form to the 
regional office of Prudential where a decision will be made 
whether to issue a policy. Mr. Ferguson testified, however, 
that if he had known that the defendant had been cancelled 
for underwriting reasons, that he wouldn't even have taken 
an application (T-84). Exhibit P-6 further provides that 
any such inquiry form, even if sent, would have to be mailed 
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to the regional service office of Prudential in Phoenix 30 
days prior to the date coverage is desired. 
Bill Zimmerman is the Associate Underwriting Manager 
at the Western Regional Service Office in Phoenix, Arizona. 
In his position he makes the rules regarding underwriting 
decisions and is not bound by the HR-10 (Exhibit P-6), and 
he can make exceptions to the rules (T-110-111). Agents or 
salesmen such as Mr. Ferguson, however, are bound by the 
rules set forth in the HR-10 (T-111). He confirmed that if 
the applicant had admitted to the prior cancellation by 
Aetna that Mr. Ferguson could not have bound coverage 
(T-117-118). If an inquiry had been made, and Mr. Zimmerman 
had known of the prior cancellation, he would have had the 
authority to nevertheless issue a policy, but he would not 
have done so (T-118-119). He also confirmed that based upon 
his knowledge of the industry in general that a standard 
line insurance company such as Prudential would not have 
insured the defendant if they had known of his prior can-
cellation by Aetna and that a high-risk or substandard 
company would probably not have written such insurance, or 
that if they did, the rate would have been perhaps 10 or 20 
times as great as the premium quoted by a standard company 
(T-122-123). 
In summary, it was clearly established without dispute 
at the time of trial that Prudential Insurance Company would 
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not have insured the defendant if he had disclosed the prior 
cancellation by Aetna. 
CREDIBILITY OF DEFENDANT 
Appellant argues that he did not know that he had been 
cancelled, that he never received any written communications 
from Aetna advising him of that fact, that he had English 
language difficulties, that he made full disclosure to Mr. 
Ferguson and that he did not intend to defraud or mislead 
Prudential or its agent. The argument is thus made that the 
trial court should have believed the defendant and not the 
other witnesses. 
Respondent suggests that the following factors, among 
others, justified the court in believing the other witnesses 
and discounting the credibility of the defendant. 
The trial judge had ample opportunity to evaluate the 
demeanor of the defendant and the substance of his testimony 
both on direct and cross examination. In addition, a re-
ported statement, under oath, was taken of the defendant 
on April 21, 1977, said statement admitted into evidence as 
plaintiff's Exhibit P-10. In addition, defendant filed an 
affidavit in connection with this lawsuit found at page 65 
of the record. Various discrepancies and inconsistencies ap-
pear therefrom including, but not limited to, the following. 
At page 74-75 of his statement, he denies making any 
claims of any type to any insurance company since 1972, with 
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the exception of a workmen's compensation claim in Cali-
fornia. On page 78 of the statement, on the other hand, he 
admits that he made a claim against Aetna. 
At page 80 of his statement, he stated that he knew 
that Aetna had cancelled, and that they did it like Pruden-
tial Insurance Company and "the same way the insurance 
companies do". At the trial he testified that Mr. Oslowski, 
the Aetna claims adjuster, had told him verbally that "you 
do not have any more insurance" (T-13-14). In his affi-
davit, however, he claims that he had only heard an oral 
rumor that "part of the policy had been cancelled" (R-68). 
At page 22 of his statement (P-10), he stated that 
Ferguson had asked him if he had had a prior homeowner's 
policy but did not recall whether Ferguson asked if a 
policy had been cancelled. He testified at the time of 
trial that Ferguson did not ask him about prior insurance 
companies or whether he had been cancelled (T-156), contrary 
to his testimony and his statement of April 21, 1977 (P-10), 
and at variance with other testimony which he gave at the 
time of trial, for example where he testified that he had 
told Ferguson that Aetna had cancelled his policy "half and 
half" (T-18). 
Without belaboring the point, a careful reading of 
the Defendant's Affidavit, his statement (P-10) and his 
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testimony at the time of trial indicates that he gave sev-
eral different versions of the critical events. First, 
that he knew that he had been cancelled by Aetna, or that he 
did not know that he had been cancelled by Aetna, or that he 
thought he had been cancelled "half and half". Second, 
that Ferguson asked him about prior cancellations and that 
defendant made full disclosure of the Aetna cancellation, 
or that Ferguson did not ask, and the defendant told him 
anyway, or that Ferguson did ask and defendant told him but 
that Ferguson did not care, or that Ferguson did not ask 
and that defendant did not tell him. 
The trial judge could have been influenced by defen-
dant's claims that he only received those documents in the 
mail which were beneficial to his position, and denied 
receiving other documents, sent to the same address, 
which were not helpful. His claim of English language 
difficulty is rebutted by the testimony of other witnesses 
and, of course, the trial court was in the best position to 
evaluate the defendant's language ability. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS. 
In reviewing the evidence in this case, certain basic 
principles of appellate review are applicable: 
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1. Disputed facts must be reviewed in the light 
most favorable to the judgment entered in the trial court, 
Smith v. Gallegos, 400 P.2d 570, 16 Utah 2d 344. 
2. The judgment of the trial court is presumed 
to be correct, Robinson v. Hreinson, 409 P.2d 121, 17 Utah 
2d 261. 
3. It is the perogative of the trial court 
to determine what aspects of the evidence he will believe 
and the court may be selective and choose those portions of 
the testimony of any witness which it thinks has the greater 
probability of being true. The trial court is the exclusive 
judge of the credibility of witnesses and is not obliged to 
believe testimony in which there is any inherent frailty. 
including self-interest, Cannon v. Wright, 531 P.2d 1290 
(Utah 1975); People's Finance v. Dornan, 497 P.2d 17 (Utah 
197 2). 
4. On review, findings and judgment of the 
trial court will be sustained if supported by any substan-
tial evidence and reasonable inferences to be drawn there-
from. In order to reverse a trial court, the evidence must 
be such that all reasonable minds would not have found as 
the trial court found, Centurion Corp. v. Fiberchern, Inc., 
562 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1977); Jensen v. Eddy, 514 P.2d 1142 
(Utah 1973). 
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5. The Supreme Court will not disturb findings of 
the trial court unless the trial court has misapplied proven 
facts or made findings of fact clearly contrary to the weight 
of the evidence. The trial court's determination of find-
ings of fact should normally stand, even though the Supreme 
Court might disagree. The advantaged position of the trial 
court, that is, close proximity to witnesses and the trial, 
should be given substantial consideration, De Vas v. Noble, 
369 P.2d 290 (Utah 1962); Valley Bank v. First Security 
Bank, 538 P.2d 298 (Utah 1975); First Security Bank v. Hall, 
504 P.2d 995 (Utah 1972). 
Respondent respectfully submits that each of the 
trial court's findings were based on substantial, competent 
and admissible evidence. The trial court's findings of 
fact are found at R-79 and for convenience are restated 
herein, with brief reference to the evidence supporting the 
findings: 
(1) That on October 6, 1976, the defendant 
applied for a policy of homeowner's (renter's) 
insurance through plaintiff's agent, Lloyd 
Ferguson. That the plaintiff's agent asked the 
defendant certain questions necessary to complete 
the application including, inter alia, questions 
relating to defendant's past loss and past insur-
ance history. 
Both the defendant and Ferguson so testified, the 
only conflict being defendant's on-again, off-again claim 
that Ferguson did not ask him about prior insurance. The 
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trial court, however, believed Mr. Ferguson's version of 
the events. 
(2) Plaintiff's agent, based upon facts 
g~ven to him b~ defendant, completed the applica-
tion form and included therein the information 
that (a) the defendant had not been cancelled 
declined acceptance, nor refused to renew by ' 
any company within the last three years, and (b) 
defend~nt had no p:ior losses except a burglary of 
a few items of nominal value from his residence at 
422 South 1200 East, Salt Lake City, in October, 
1975, and (c) defendant had no previous homeowner's 
insurance and had made no previous claims. 
The testimony of both the defendant and Mr. Ferguson, 
and the application itself (Exhibit P-1) support this 
finding. 
(3) That thereafter, the defendant signed 
the application ce-tifying that the declarations 
and statements therein were complete and true to 
the best of his knowledge and belief and that the 
company (plaintiff) could rely upon them in the 
issuance of any policy based upon said application. 
Defendant admits that he signed Exhibit P-1; the 
certification that the statements made in the application 
are true is printed on the application form immediately over 
defendant's signature. 
(4) That a copy of the application was de-
livered to and furnished to the defendant. That 
within a few days after October 6, 1976, the de-
fendant read over the application in detail and 
noted an error in the application relating to 
the effective date of the policy, and that defen-
dant called the existence of the error to the 
attention of plaintiff's agent who thereafte:, at 
the request of defendant, corrected the appl~ca­
t ion in the particular complained of and deliv-
ered a corrected copy to defendant. That at no 
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time did defendant advise the plaintiff or any of 
plaintiff's agents of any errors, misrepresenta-
tions, omissions, concealment of facts or incor-
rect statements contained in said application at 
any time prior to the subsequent fire of October 19, 
1976. 
Defendant admitted that he read over the application 
and advised Mr. Ferguson of the error regarding the incep-
tion date. He admits that he did not advise Mr. Ferguson of 
any of the other misstatements or errors set forth in the 
application. 
(5) That in reliance upon the truth and 
accuracy of the information contained in the 
application and furnished to him by defendant, 
plaintiff's agent bound coverage effective October 
6, 1976 and subsequently, in reliance upon the 
information contained in the application, the 
regional service office of Prudential issued its 
homeowner's policy No. 51-6H148371. 
There was no dispute as to this finding. Mr. Ferguson 
and Mr. Zimmerman so testified. 
(6) That on approximately October 19, 
1976, defendant allegedly sustained a loss of 
certain personal property as a result of a fire at 
938 East 3rd South Street, Salt Lake City, and 
subsequently made claim against plaintiff for the 
loss of certain items of personal property, 
including but not limited to, at least three 
valuable Persian rugs having an alleged value in 
excess of $15,000.00. 
There was no dispute as to this finding. Defendant so 
testified. 
(7) That the application contained, inter 
alia, the following misrepresentations, omissions, 
concealment of facts and incorrect statements: 
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. (a) That defendant had only had one 
prior loss, to wit, a relatively minor 
burglary of a few items of nominal value from 
defendant's residence at 422 South 1200 East 
Salt Lake City, in October, 1975. ' 
In fact, defendant had had another 
burglary loss within three years while 
residing in California, and in addition, the 
Salt Lake burglary of October, 1975, involved 
a large amount of property having a value 
claimed by defendant in excess of $8,000.00. 
(b) That defendant had not had previous 
homeowner's insurance and had not made claim 
against another insurance company. 
In fact, defendant had had a policy of 
similar insurance with Aetna Life & Casualty 
Company in October of 1975, had submitted a 
proof of loss to Aetna for approximately 
$8,600.00, which proof of loss was denied by 
Aetna and ultimately compromised for approxi-
mately $5,500.00. That defendant had had a 
substantial dispute with Aetna regarding the 
settlement of the burglary claim in October, 
1975, resulting in, inter alia, defendant's 
complaint to the Utah State Insurance Commis-
sioner regarding Aetna's handling of his 
claim, and the cancellation of his insurance 
policies with Aetna. 
(c) That during the three years prior 
to October 6, 1976, that the defendant had 
not been cancelled, refused renewal, nor 
declined acceptance, by any company. 
In fact, defendant called an agent 
of Aetna, Ed o. Smith & Sons Insurance 
Agency, on October 2, 1975 and requested 
a verbal binder of homeowner's or renter's 
insurance. Coverage was bound by Aetna's 
agent. On October 7, 1975, defendant called 
Ed o. Smith & Sons and inquired whether 
Persian rugs would be covered under that 
policy and when advised that they w~uld need 
to be scheduled, requested and receiv~d a 
binder specifically insuring the Persian 
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rugs. On October 9, the defendant reported 
a burglary of various items of personal 
property, including the rugs, to Ed o. Smith, 
said burglary allegedly occurring on October 
8, 1975. Thereafter, his policies of insur-
ance with Aetna were cancelled by Aetna 
Insurance Company which instructed Ed D. 
Smith & Sons to advise defendant of said 
cancellation. That defendant was advised of 
the cancellation of his Aetna policies by 
virtue of, inter alia, a letter directed to 
him from Ed D. Smith & Sons dated October 17, 
1975, verbal advice received from a claims 
representative of Aetna Insurance Company and 
written indication of the short-term expira-
tion of his policies as set forth on the 
proof of loss and on the face of two drafts 
issued to defendant by Aetna. That defendant 
well knew he had been cancelled by Aetna 
prior to applying for insurance with plain-
tiff on October 6, 1976. That cancellation 
of defendant's Aetna policies was not the 
result of nonpayment of premium nor any 
termination of Aetna's agency relationship 
with Ed D. Smith & Sons, but rather because 
of the unusual nature of defendant's alleged 
loss and claim against Aetna. 
Defendant admits to the other burglary in California 
and that he did not so advise Ferguson. He admits that the 
loss in Salt Lake in October, 1975, was for approximately 
$8,600.00. Ferguson testified that defendant did not advise 
him of the magnitude of that burglary loss. His dealings 
with Aetna are confirmed by the defendant's own admissions, 
and by the testimony of Mr. Oslowski and Linda Messerly. 
The findings are further supported by Exhibits P-1, 2, 3, 
4 and 5. 
(8) That at all times herein material, and 
specifically prior to October 6, 1976, the defen-
dant well knew all of the above, and knew that 
-22-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
tho~e.facts would be relevant to the plaintiff's 
~ecision wh7ther or not to bind coverage or to 
issu7 a poli7y, but that nevertheless defendant 
kn~wingly, willfully and intentionally concealed 
said fa~ts from.the plaintiff and the plaintiff's 
agent with the intent to deceive and defraud 
plaintiff and to induce it to bind coverage and 
issue a policy of insurance. 
There is no doubt but that the defendant well knew all 
of the facts contained in findings number 7 and 8. That he 
did so willfully and with the intent to deceive and defraud 
is a reasonable inference to be drawn from the circumstances 
of the case. Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Zimmerman testified 
without dispute that the representations on the application 
induced Prudential to bind coverage and that Prudential 
would not have done so if the true facts had been known. 
(9) That plaintiff relied upon the false 
representations made by defendant and plaintiff's 
agent accordingly bound the coverage and the 
plaintiff ultimately issued its policy of insur-
ance based upon said application. That the 
misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of 
facts and incorrect statements were fraudulent 
material to the acceptance of the risk by the 
plaintfiff, and that the plaintiff's agent would 
not have bound coverage if the true facts had been 
disclosed and that plaintiff would not have issued 
its policy if the true facts had been known. That 
the plaintiff, acting in good faith, and reasonably 
and naturally and in accordance with the usual 
practice among insurance companies under circum-
stances such as existed here would not have bound 
coverage or issued the policy, and wou~d hav7 . 
rejected the application of defendant if plaintiff 
had known the true facts. 
Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Zimmerman so testified. Defendant 
put on no evidence that Prudential, or any other insurance 
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company, would have insured the defendant if he had disclosed 
the facts of the prior cancellation. 
(10) That the defendant was conversant in 
the English language and could speak, read, write 
and understand same, that defendant was not pre-
vented in any way from reading the application, 
that defendant had ample opportunity to read 
said application and did in fact read and sign 
said application prior to the alleged loss of 
October 19, 1976. 
This finding is supported by the defendant's own 
admissions and by the testimony of Mr. Oslowski, Miss 
Messerly and Lloyd Ferguson. 
(11) That defendant intentionally, know-
ingly and willfully concealed material facts from 
plaintiff which he knew were material to plain-
tiff's acceptance of the risk, that plaintiff in 
good faith would nnt have accepted the risk if it 
had known of the true facts, and that plaintiff 
was not advised of the true nature of the misrep-
resentation, omissions, concealment of facts and 
incorrect statements in advance of issuance of 
the policy or in advance of the loss of October 
19, 1976. 
That Prudential was never advised of the prior cancel-
lation prior to the fire was not disputed. The findings of 
intent and willfulness are reasonable inferences drawn from 
the facts of the case. The evidence was undisputed that 
Prudential would not have accepted the risk if it had known 
of the true facts. 
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II 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
WERE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAW. 
The statute which governs cases of this nature is 
§31-19-8 Utah Code Annotated (1953). That statute provides 
in relevant part that 
All statements and descriptions in any 
application for an insurance policy ••• shall be 
deemed to be representations and not warranties. 
Misrepresentations, omissions, concealment of 
facts and incorrect statements shall not prevent a 
recovery under the policy or contract unless: 
{a) Fraudulent; or 
(b) Material either to the acceptance 
of the risk, or to the hazard assumed by the 
insurer; or 
(c) The insurer in good faith either 
would not have issued the policy • • • or 
would not have issued .•. it at the same 
premium rate, or would not have issued (it) 
••. in as large an amount, or would not 
have provided coverage with respect to the 
hazard resulting in the loss, if the true 
facts had been made known to the insurer as 
required either by the application for the 
policy or contract or otherwise. 
It should be noted that the statute speaks in the 
alternative, that is, a misrepresentation or omission will 
prevent recovery under the policy of insurance if fraudu-
lent, or material to the acceptance of the risk, ~ the 
insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy at 
all, or at the same rate. 
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The following brief chronological analysis of Utah and 
Tenth Circuit cases may be helpful to the court in setting 
forth prior interpretations of the statute, and prior court 
decisions under common law. 
The first case found which deals with this issue is 
Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 181 P.448 (Utah 1919). 
The beneficiary brought an action against the company to 
recover under a policy of life insurance. The company de-
fended upon the basis that certain misrepresentations had 
been made by the insured as to whether he had a life-
threatening condition. The trial court directed a verdict 
for the insurance company. The Supreme Court reversed 
because there were factual questions relating to whether the 
insured in fact knew that he had a life-threatening condi-
tion, whether he was in fact asked by the agent, and whether 
either the insured or the agent knew that he (the insured) 
had any disease and the seriousness thereof. The court 
observed that the evidence was sufficient to support a 
jury verdict for either party. The court adopts the view 
that in order to defeat coverage, an insurance company would 
need to prove that the statements made by the insured were 
untrue and that the insured knew or should have known them 
to be untrue at the time they were made. 
The next case found which was decided on this question 
is Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 57 P.2d 362 (Utah 
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1936). The Utah Supreme Court affirmed a directed verdict 
for the insurance company where the deceased had represented 
that she had no prior diseases, specifically cancer, and 
denied any prior treatment by doctors. In fact, she was 
suffering from cancer and, presumably, knew it. It was held 
that the statements made to the company were material to the 
risk and must have been knowingly false. Since there was 
only one reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, a 
directed verdict for the company was proper. 
In 1938 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided 
Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc., 97 F.2d 583 (10th 
Cir. 1938). The District Court had directed a verdict for 
the company and the Tenth Circuit reversed. While it 
appeared that the deceased had misrepresented his age, 
address, occupation and •good morals", it further appeared 
that age was irrelevant by the policy provisions, that the 
address and the insured's occupation were essentially 
truthful and in any event not material, that is, that 
neither the address nor the occupation made the risk any 
more hazardous. There was no evidence that the company 
would not have insured him if it had known the true facts. 
The Tenth Circuit cites Chadwick v. Beneficial Life Ins. 
Co., supra, for the proposition that 
A misrepresentation will.not co~stitute a 
defense to an action on a policy of insurance 
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unless it was intentionally untrue or was made 
with a reckless disregard for its truth or 
falsity. Where an insured knowingly makes a 
material misrepresentation, proof of an actual, 
conscious purpose to deceive is not necessary. 
A material fact is any fact, the knowledge or 
ignorance of which would naturally influence the 
insurer's judgment in making the contract, in 
estimating the degree and character of the risk, 
or in fixing the rate of insurance. 97 F.2d at 
586. 
North American Accident Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, 107 F.2d 
853 {10th Cir. 1939) affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the 
insured. The insurance company had claimed that the insured 
had misrepresented a prior declination of similar insur-
ance. The evidence established that the insured truthfully 
disclosed prior applications but that he denied they had 
been declined. However, the evidence was that the applica-
tions were conditional and the jury found that the insured 
did not know they had been declined. It was held that the 
jury's verdict was supported by substantial evidence. 
In 1940 the Tenth Circuit decided Zolintakis v. Equitable 
Life Assur. Soc., 108 F.2d 902 {10th Cir. 1940) a second time. 
The jury, on a special verdict, found that the representa-
tions regarding residence and occupation were not strictly 
true, but that they were not knowingly and intentionally 
untrue nor made with the intent to defraud. Again, the 
court pointed out that there was conflicting evidence and 
inferences regarding both representations, and that it was 
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questionable whether they were even material, and specific-
ally a jury finding of no knowing concealment. Under those 
facts, the insured was entitled to prevail. The court 
notes, however, that 
One cannot knowingly conceal or misrepresent 
facts which one knows would influence the risk or 
the issuance of the policy, and then be heard to 
say that he did not intend to deceive or defraud, 
108 F.2d at 906. 
In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Grow, 135 P.2d 120 (Utah 
1943) the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the insured 
where the company disputed coverage, claiming that the in-
sured had failed to disclose the existence of heart disease. 
However, there was evid~nce that the insured may not have 
known of his condition. There was evidence that the appli-
cation was not read to him and that he did not read it. He 
had a confusing medical history. The evidence showed that 
the agent may not have asked, and if he did, that he was 
told of the problem by the insured but that the agent did 
not inquire further. While the insured signed the appli-
cation, there was no evidence he had read it. Prior to 
the loss, the agent was told about an aggravation of the 
insured's heart condition, but the agent did not change the 
application because "it was not important." The court 
reaffirmed the rule in Chadwick, observing that since the 
company had failed to prove a knowing misrepresentation, 
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and that no intent to defraud was shown, the verdict was 
supported by the evidence. Chief Justice Wolfe noted that 
evidence that the representations made were untrue and that 
the insured knew or should have known they were untrue, 
would ordinarily be sufficient proof of the fact that they 
were fraudulent, that is, that the insured intended to 
deceive. Justice McDonough observed that a finder of fact 
could not find an absence of intent to defraud where the 
applicant knowingly misrepresented facts which he knew or 
should have known would have influenced the insurer in 
accepting the risk. 
Fidelity & Casualty Co. of New York v. Middlemiss, 135 
P.2d 275 (Utah 1943) affirmed a verdict for the insurance 
company. The insured, a doctor, denied having any physical 
defects whereas, in fact, he had lost 80% of the vision in 
the right eye. He later lost the remaining 20% and made 
claim against the company. He claimed his answers were 
"true in the general sense." It was held that his conten-
tion was not sufficient as he knew, or should have known, 
that the company may not want to insure his right eye which 
already was damaged. The doctor had read the application. 
In Farrington v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 232 P.2d 
754 (Utah 1951) a verdict for the insured was affirmed. The 
company had claimed a misrepresentation regarding the nature 
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of the use of the building. However, the evidence was that 
the plaintiff had advised the defendant's agent of the 
change of use after the issuance of the policy but prior to 
the loss, and thus knowledge of the change of use was 
imputed to the company. The change of use was not shown to 
be material and the company accepted premiums after knowl-
edge of all material facts. 
In 1954 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a jury verdict 
in favor of an insured in Prudential Ins. Co. of America 
v. Willsey, 214 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1954). The jury found, 
and the evidence supported a finding that the insured had 
made full disclosure, that the agent may or may not have 
written the appropriate answers on the application, and the 
insured had not read the application before signing it. 
Wooton v. Combined Ins. Co. of America, 395 P.2d 724 
(Utah 1964) affirmed a summary judgment in favor of the 
insured. The company had claimed misrepresentations as to 
the insured's health, that is that he had had polio, walked 
with a limp and had retired from his job. The insured died 
when he was run over by a car. The evidence was, however, 
that the company's agent knew that the insured limped, and 
that he had had polio as a child. He in fact was fully 
recovered from the polio except for the limp. There was 
no evidence of materiality since the death was in no related 
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to the physical defect and in any event the company had 
expressly excluded coverage for polio or any residual 
paralysis. 
In Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 407 P.2d 
685 (Utah 1965) the insured, when applying for life insur-
ance, had denied any lost time from work, heart disease, or 
medical treatment for heart disease. In fact, he had been 
hospitalized for a heart attack two years before applying 
for insurance and had been told of his heart problem by his 
doctors. The insured did, however, make full disclosure of 
those facts to the agent who falsely recorded the insured's 
answers. The Supreme Court held, however, that the insured 
was duty bound to read the application, that he had signed 
it and was bound by the answers. He permitted false infor-
mation to be submitted to the company. The court adopted 
the majority view that the insured is bound by misstatements 
appearing in an application, particularly where he had an 
opportunity to read the application and had signed it. The 
court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the insurance 
company. 
The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the insured 
in Pritchett v. Equitable Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 421 P.2d 
943 (Utah 1966). The company claimed that the insured had 
failed to disclose that she had cancer. However, there was 
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no evidence that she had cancer at the time that she applied 
for insurance. It was claimed that she should have told the 
company about a prior stomach problem. However, the evidence 
showed that the company (had it known) would merely have 
excluded coverage for stomach problems and still would have 
been liable for cancer. Thus, there was no showing of 
materiality. 
In Marks v. Continental Casualt~, 427 P.2d 387 
(Utah 1967) a judgment in favor of the insured was sus-
tained. The company had claimed that the insured had 
concealed partial paralysis of the left arm occurring six 
years before the application and the removal of her "tail-
bone" nine years before. The Supreme Court sustained the 
judgment of the trial court for it appeared that the agent 
was her brother-in-law and he well knew her past medical 
history. She did not read the application and, in fact, 
signed it in blank and mailed it to her brother-in-law. It 
also appeared that the application did not contain any 
language near the signature line to the effect that the 
applicant had read the foregoing answers and that they are 
true and correct. It further appeared that the misrepre-
sentation, if any, was not material as no relationship 
appeared between the prior medical problems and the actual 
back operation for which claim was made. 
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Utah Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor 
of the insurance company in Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas. 
Co., 470 P.2d 261 (Utah 1970), where the court found that 
the policy was not contestable since it was a reinstatement 
of a prior policy. Thus, the alleged misrepresentation was 
not material to the court's decision, however, in dicta 
Justice Callister observed that it was very questionable 
whether the insured's visits with a psychiatrist, for 
marriage counseling, were in fact material to the risk. He 
further noted that summary judgment should not have been 
granted for the insurance company based upon a self-serving 
affidavit from the insurance company's defense attorney that 
the company would not have reinstated the policy if they had 
known of the visits with the psychiatrist. Judge Callister 
restates what appears to be the state of the law with regard 
to cases of this nature: 
First, unless the misrepresentations in the 
negotiation for an insurance policy are made with 
intent to deceive and materially affect either the 
acceptance of the risk or the hazard assumed by 
the insurer, the insurance contract cannot be 
avoided by an insurance company. Mere falsity of 
answers to questions propounded are insufficient 
if not knowingly made with intent to deceive and 
defraud. Second, whether or not a misstatement in 
an application is material to the risk, while it 
is for the jury to determine, depends not upon 
what the insurer or the insured may think about 
the materiality or the importance of the false 
information given or the true information with-
held, but upon what those engaged in the insurance 
business, acting reasonably and naturally in 
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accord~nce with the usual practice among insurance 
companies under such circumstances, would have 
done had they known the truth; that is, whether 
reasonably careful and intelligent men would have 
regarded the facts stated as substantially increas-
ing the chances of the happening of the event 
insured against so as to cause a rejection of the 
application. 470 P.2d at 263. 
In Moore v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 491 P.2d 
227 (Utah 1971), the Supreme Court affirmed a jury verdict 
in favor of the plaintiff. The company contended that the 
plaintiff's decedent had misstated his medical history, that 
is that he had failed to disclose a prior condition diag-
nosed as "cataplexy•, a rather rare condition for which 
there is no known medical explanation. The insured later 
died of a heart attack, and there was no evidence that the 
heart attack was in any way related to cataplexy. A witness 
for the insurance company testified that if the company had 
known about the cataplexy it would not have issued the 
policy, a contention which the jury evidently rejected. The 
Supreme Court affirmed the verdict in favor of the insured 
observing that it was the company's burden to prove to the 
jury that it would not have issued the policy but that the 
jury was certainly not required to believe the company's 
witness which was "suffused with self-interest." Reasonable 
minds might differ as to whether the company in fact would 
have issued the policy, even if they had known of the pre-
existing medical problem. 
-35-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The following general principles of law may be dis-
tilled from the above-cited cases. 
(1) An insurance company may void a policy of insur-
ance where the applicant intentionally misrepresents certain 
facts which may affect the acceptance of the risk or the 
hazard assumed by the insurer. 
(2) Whether an applicant in fact knew that the misrep-
resentation was being made is a factual question. 
(3) Whether the applicant intended to defraud the 
insurance company is a factual question. 
(4) Some misrepresentations, which are borderline, may 
or may not be material to the risk. In such a case, it is a 
factual question whether the company would, or would not 
have, issued the policy. 
(5) Some misrepresentations rise to SUL~ a level of 
importance that, if it can be established that the insured 
knew that the misrepresentation was being made, the court 
will hold the misrepresentation to be material as a matter 
of law, Eklund v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. and Fidelity & 
Casualty Co. of New York v. Middlemiss, supra. 
(6) An insured who reads and signs the application is 
bound by the answers therein, and will not be excused by 
claiming that the agent wrote down the wrong information, 
Theros v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra. 
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Failure to disclose prior cancellations is one of 
the more serious misrepresentations which may be made in 
applying for insurance. Only one case interpreting Utah law 
directly deals with that question (North American Accident 
Ins. Co. v. Tebbs, supra), which affirmed a verdict against 
the company, but only where the jury specifically found that 
the insured did not know that he had previously been de-
clined by another company. Many cases hold that where the 
insured in fact knew of the prior cancellation, such a 
misrepresentation is material as a matter of law. 
In Globe Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Still, 376 F.2d 
611 (5th Cir. 1967) the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
applied a Georgia statute identical to §31-19-8, Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) to facts nearly identical to 
those undisputed in the present case. Three applications 
for life, accident and health insurance on defendant Still 
were taken at his home by plaintiff's agent. The agent 
asked the questions contained in the applications and 
recorded the defendant's responses. Defendant Still then 
signed the applications. One of the applications inquired 
as to whether any insurer had ever declined an application 
by defendant Still or cancelled his insurance. The answer 
recorded by the plaintiff's agent was "no". As a matter of 
fact, another insurance company had previously cancelled a 
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health and accident policy issued to defendant Still and had 
on two occasions declined his application for insurance. 
The District Court submitted the issue of material misrep-
resentation to the jury, but the Circuit Court reversed 
holding: 
[I]t was error to submit to the jury the 
question of whether there was a false represen-
tation in the application for policy number 84 
concerning insurance that was cancelled and ap-
plications that were declined by other companies. 
* * * 
With respect to the denial of the cancella-
tion of other insurance and declined applications 
in the application for policy number 84, it is 
uncontradicted that Still signed the application 
after it had been completed by the agent. He was 
bound by the answers that there had been no can-
cellations of insurance or applications declined 
by other companies. 
The evidence in this case is clear that 
despite the statement on the application Still 
had, in fact, been cancelled and declined by 
another company. Under the law of Georgia such a 
false statement about rejection or cancellation of 
other insurance is a material misrepresentation 
and voids the policy as a matter of law. (Cita-
tions omitted). It was thus not a proper matter 
for jury resolution. Id. at 613 and 614. 
In First Nat. Bene. Soc. v. Fiske, 101 P.2d 205 
(Arizona 1940) the trial court submitted to a jury the 
question of whether the insured's failure to list in the 
application all insurance companies which had previously 
rejected his applications was a material misrepresentation. 
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The Arizona Supreme Court quoted from a previous opinion of 
that Court and held: 
.•• [W]here an application with its Answers 
becomes a part of a policy, as it did in this 
case, a statement therein by the applicant that he 
has never been denied insurance is as a matter of 
law material and, if false, voids the policy at 
the option of the insurer. This rule is accepted 
by practically all the courts and in our view 
rests upon a sound basis because disclosure of the 
fact that one applying for a policy has been 
rejected by another company immediately suggests 
that he is probably not a good risk and undoubt-
edly leads to a more careful and thorough exami-
nation than would be true in the case of one whose 
application had not been rejected. It not only 
informs the company whether other insurers have 
regarded him as unsafe, and places it, so to 
speak, upon inquiry, but may advise it as to any 
anxiety for insurance the applicant may have. 
(Emphasis added). Id. at 206 and 207. 
See also, Safeco Insurance Company of America v. Gonacha, 
350 P.2d 189 (Colorado 1960) where the Colorado Supreme 
Court reversed the trial court and held that misrepresen-
tations regarding prior cancellations are material to the 
risk as a matter of law. 
The appellant argues that the District Court erred 
in refusing to apply an industry standard in determining 
the materiality of the misrepresentations. Appellant cites 
Burnham v. Bankers Life & Cas., supra, as authority for the 
proposition that the court must apply an industry standard. 
Burnham, of course, notes that whether a misstatement is 
material is for the jury (or the finder of fact) to determine. 
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Burnham and Moore v. Prudential, supra, should be read only 
as requiring evidence of industry practice only where the 
particular company involved does not have a definite written 
rule. In the instant case, of course, the rule was in 
writing and clearly set forth in Exhibit P-6. In any event, 
there was in fact evidence of the industry standard, put on 
through the testimony of Mr. Zimmerman, whom the court, 
unlike the jury in Moore v. Prudential, chose to believe. 
In addition, the court made a specific finding that the 
plaintiff herein would not have insured the defendant, not 
only because of the written rule, but also in accordance 
with the usual industry practice. Defendant made no attempt 
at the time of trial to put on any evidence that other in-
surance companies would have insured the defendant if they 
had known of the prior cancellation. 
CONCLUSION 
The court found, and the evidence supported, that the 
defendant knowingly misrepresented his past insurance 
history to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff would not 
have insured him if it had known the true facts. The court 
found, and the evidence supports, that the defendant's 
misrepresentations were intentional, fraudulent and cal-
culated to mislead the plaintiff. All of the court's 
findings are fully supported by competent evidence. The 
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court's conclusions are consistent with, and indeed man-
dated by, the statutes of the state of Utah and the prior 
decisions of this Court. 
The findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment 
of the District Court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this [Q~ day of August, 1979. 
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